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Market Report
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Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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215.00

135.00

135.00

215.00

127.50

115.00

293.50

205.00

213.50

107.00

64.50

61.00

Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ No Market

“Risk is a pervasive but subtle concept, widely used
and discussed but not well understood.” (Clive W.J.
Granger, 2003 Nobel Prize winner)
When we hear and talk about financial markets, the
volatility of prices or returns is commonly adopted to discuss
risk. It is common to hear in the news that markets have
become more volatile (and hence riskier) in recent years. So
let us take a look at the soybean market and explore how
volatility has evolved over time. Figure 1 (on next page),
shows daily nearby futures prices for soybeans between July
1959 and May 2013. We’ll split the sample into four periods
for our analysis: Aug/59–Jul/72; Aug/72–Jul/88;
Aug/88–Jul/05; and Aug/05–May/13.
However, volatility is often discussed in terms of how
much prices are changing, so let us talk about percentage
price changes instead of price levels. Percentage price
changes are calculated as the change in price between today
and yesterday, divided by yesterday’s price. For example, if
today’s price is $13.15/bu and yesterday’s price was
$13.10/bu, the price change is $0.05/bu and the percentage
price change is 0.05/13.10 = 0.0038= 0.38%. In other words,
today’s price of $13.15/bu is 0.38% higher than yesterday’s
price of $13.10/bu. Figure 2 (on next page), shows daily
percentage price changes for soybeans between July 1959 and
May 2013, also divided into four sub-periods.
Volatility is often represented by the standard deviation
of percentage price changes over a certain period of time, so
it measures how much percentage price changes deviate from
the average percentage price change of the period. Figure 3
(on next page), shows the calculated volatility (standard
deviation) of percentage price changes in each of the four
sub-periods in our sample. We can see that volatility in the
most recent time period (Aug/05–May/13) is higher than in
the previous period (Aug/88–Jul/05), but about the same as
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the volatility observed in
A ug /72–Jul/88. Even
though th e soybean
market has been more
volatile in the last eight
years (2005-2013)
compared to the 19882005 perio d, recent
volatility has been about
the same as observed in
the 1972-1988 period.
Does that mean that the
soybean markets have
recen tly
b een
experiencing historically
high levels of risk since
1959?
When we think about
risk, what typically comes
to mind is the notion of
loss. Accordingly, the
Merriam-Webster
dictionary defines risk as
“possibility of loss or
injury,” “someone or
something that creates or
suggests a hazard,” “the
chance of loss or the perils
to the subject matter of an
insurance contract,” “a
person or thing that is a
specified hazard to an
insurer,” “an insurance
hazard from a specified
cause of source,” or “the
chance that an investment
(as a stock or commodity)
will lose value.” This
definition is consistent
w ith f in d in g s fro m
research on risk
perception. In the context
of financial decisions,
empirical work has shown
that individuals normally
think about risk as the
failure to achieve a certain
goal, while returns beyond
that goal are seen as profit
opportunities. But this is
not the way that volatility
is calculated.
Volatility is based on the standard deviation, which takes
into account all deviations from the average percentage price

change during a period of
time. Since it takes into
account deviations above
and below the average,
there is high volatility if
either upside deviations
or downside deviations
are large. But the
possibility of losses is not
necessarily affected by
both types of deviations.
A grain producer would
probably be more
concerned about soybean
prices dropping below
his cost of production (or
any other benchmark),
and would likely be
happy to see soybean
prices rising above his
cost of production. On
the other hand, a food
processor would be more
concerned about soybean
prices increasing above
its break-even price, and
not really worried about
soybean prices falling
below its break-even
price. But when we use
volatility we are
considering both the
failure to achieve a
certain goal and the
possibility of doing better
than that goal in the
calculation of risk.
Therefore, volatility
would be more properly
used as a measure of
variability. When we say
the soybean market has
reached a historically
high level of volatility in
the last eight years, it
means that there has been
larger dispersion in
percentage price prices.
This indicates a larger
magnitude of downside
percentage price changes,
and also a larger magnitude of upside percentage price
changes. Larger volatility implies more chances of losing, but
also more profit potential. This is a standard idea in finance
that we sometimes forget: if we want to obtain higher returns

we have to take more risk, i.e., the possibility of higher returns
is followed by a chance of larger losses.

!

Another issue with volatility as a risk measure is that it can
be misleading if the distribution of percentage price changes
is asymmetric. In this case, there can be more chances to make
a profit than a loss (or vice-versa). In fact, a market that
exhibits large profit potential and a small chance of losses can
have the same volatility as another market with small profit
potential and a large chance of loss. So it is worth exploring
how percentage price changes in the soybean market have
been distributed over time. In Figure 4 (on next page), the
percentage price changes were split into positive and negative
values and expressed in terms of standard deviation. How
many days exhibited positive and negative percentage price
changes in each period were then counted. For example, in
Aug/05–May/13 there were 172 days with positive percentage
price changes within one standard deviation, and 158 days
with negative percentage price changes within one standard
deviation.

As a final cautionary point, historical data can be used to
estimate the volatility of the distribution of percentage price
changes for the future, allowing us to forecast how volatile
prices will be in the future, or how much can be gained or lost
during a certain period. However, those estimates implicitly
assume that the future will be similar to the past, i.e., price
behavior in the future will resemble observed price behavior
during the period whose data was used in the estimates. This
can be a dangerous assumption, since the behavior of prices
has not been constant over time. Historical data can still be
used as a reference for future volatility and other risk
measures, but it is recommended to also use stress tests with
the estimates. A stress test is essentially an exercise to explore
what can happen if volatility levels turn out to be larger than
what was initially forecast, and what kind of events (or series
of events) can cause those values to be larger than estimated.
Stress tests can be particularly useful in environments where
price variability keeps increasing, and extreme price changes
become more frequent than they used to be in the past, such
as what we have been observing in the soybean market in
recent years.

The charts in Figure 4 show that positive percentage price
changes happened more often than negative percentage price
changes for small values (within one standard deviation).
However, positive percentage price changes were less frequent
than negative percentage price changes for larger values
(greater than two standard deviations). In particular, the last
two time periods showed proportionally more negative
percentage price changes for extreme values (four standard
deviations or more). For example, in 2005-2013 there was only
one day with a positive extreme price change (four standard
deviations or more) and six days with negative extreme price
changes. The discussion of extreme price changes is important
but sometimes neglected. Would a business be better off by
losing money in 20 days or by losing money in only one day
during a certain time period? Now, what if the loss in each of
those 20 days was $1,000 (for a total loss of $20,000) while
the loss in that single day was $100,000? The frequency of
losses is certainly important, but so is the magnitude of those
losses.
The purpose of this article is to discuss different ways to
measure price risk and expand on the notion of volatility. The
main points from the analysis are summarized below.
!

There are many ways to measure and think about price
risk.

!

Volatility shows price variability, which implies both
profit potential and chance of losses.

!

Looking at historical price changes divided into positive
and negative values provides a more complete picture of
the frequency and magnitude of profit potential and
chance of loss.

!

Positive percentage price changes have been more
frequent for smaller values, while negative percentage
price changes have been more frequent for larger values.

Negative extreme price changes have become more
frequent in the soybean market.
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